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STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE 
OF
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 
A N Kakkar
Malay Peninsula has played several times a notable part on the world's 
stage About 6000 B C it was a bridge down which ancestors of the Australian 
aborigine and of the Papuan made their way to the narrow waters they crossed one 
after another to their homes About 200 B C the ancestors of the Malays 
descended its rivers on their trek from Yunan to Sumatra and Java and beyond 
Then, when India and China had built ships for the high seas, a Malay Buddhist 
empire, Sri Vijaya, maintained a footing m  the north of the peninsula to 
command the Straits of Malacca, as it maintained a footing in Palembang to 
command the Sunda straits For five centuries the fleets of its Maharaja 
intercepted ships faring between India and China to levy tribute and toll, as 
afterwards the fleets of Portuguese and Dutch monopolists were to do Besides 
being a Malaya world market, Malacca also became a centre from which Indian and 
Arab Missionaries carried the religion of Muhammad to the islands of the 
archipelago 1 Then came the European In 1511 d'Albuquerque captured Malacca 
which was to be Portugal's base for trade with the Spice Islands and the Far 
East From Portugal it was wrested in 1641 by the Dutch, who, having settled at 
Batavia to command the Sunda Straits, wanted, like Sri Vijaya, to dominate the 
Straits of Malacca also Under Dutch rule Malacca, after nearly two and a half 
centuries of greatness, was eclipsed by Batavia, and when m  the nineteenth 
century it was transferred to Great Britain, the increased draught of East India 
men had already made it a less convenient port of call than Raffles' "political
child" Singapore, where the introduction of free trade furnished modern Asia 
with a new pattern of commerce and government A century later the demand of
2the motor industry for tin and rubber lifted Singapore into one of the world's 
ten greatest ports In 1941 the capture of that key to the Pacific by the 
Japanese saw the defence of Netherlands India collapse like a house of cards, 
and exposed India and Australia to menace 2 It replaced those of a former 
colonial era, which in her turn was built not m  a vacuum but with widely 
varying degrees of continuity, upon the rema1ns of others which had preceded 
them It is, therefore, essential to give appropriate recognition to the 
operative geographical context at each of the relevant stages of historical 
development
This is clearly illustrated by consideration of the Federation of Malaysia 
as the successor state to the former British dependencies in Malaysia and the 
ooservers are conscious of the critical position which Malaysia occupies at the 
crossroads of Southeast Asia but the geographical horizons of its indigenous 
peoples have generally been more narrowly restricted Even the British did not 
consider Southeast Asia as a distinctive region Nevertheless Southeast Asia 
had possessed at least some elements of unity since very early times, and 
without an appreciation of this fact it is impossible to understand the true 
significance of the various problems with which Malaysia is faced today
Malaysia consists of the peninsula which forms the most southerly portion 
of the land mass of Southeast Asia and of the northern lozenge of land running 
five hundred miles southwards from the land mass of eastern Asia into a region 
of islands, large and small, spread over the equator2 When Malaysia was formed 
m  1963 Singapore was included, but it ceased to be part of Malaysia in August 
1965 To the north is Thailand, formerly called Siam To the west and south 
lie Sumatra, the Riau islands, and the rest of the island of Borneo, all parts 
of Indonesia To the northeast of Borneo are Palawan and other smaller islands,
3belonging to the Philippines Malaysia is thus at the centre of the Southeast 
Asia region, sharing with its neighbours ties of race, religion, culture and 
trade Islands abound on either side of the peninsula with adjacent shore 
features The whole peninsula is one vast forest intersected in every direction 
by countless rivers and streams which together constitute one of the most lavish 
water-systems m  the world Only an insignificant fraction of these forests has 
ever beai traversed by human beings, and those who travel rarely leave the banks 
of streams except to pass from one river system to another 4
The principal rivers on the wsst coast are the Perak, the Bernam and the 
Muar The first is navigable for steamers up to 40 miles and for country craft 
to 250 miles The Bernam is deeper and navigable for about one hundred miles, 
while Muar irrigates a very fertile valley and is navigable for local craft to a 
hundred and fifty miles On the east coast the rivers are the chief means of 
communications and the important ones among them are the Kuantan, Ranpin, 
Kelantan, Pahang and Trennganu 5
The soil of the peninsula is remarkably fertile both m  the plains and on 
the mountain slopes The richness of soil has resulted in dense growth of high 
trees, shrubs, bushes, underwood, creepers, climbing plants and trailing vines, 
all hung by fans, mosses and parasitic growths and bound together by rattans and 
rope like trailer In most places the jungle is so thick that it is impossible 
to go through it without the aid of a wood knife, and even the wild beasts are 
known to use well worn-game-tricks to move about In the interior, brakes of 
bamboos are found, many of which spread for miles along the river banks 6 One 
finds it difficult to deny that there are some fundamental difficulties about 
recognizing Malaysia as a one single nation Geographically and historically, 
northern Borneo (now known as "Sabah and Sarawak") has been quite separate from
4the Malayan peninsula and contacts m  ancient times were probably few and far 
between The main features the two regions share are similar flora and fauna, 
similar climate, similar cuti ture and peoples, but these are also shared by the 
greater part of island Southeast Asia Since the fifteenth century, we can see 
two periods when the contacts between the peninsula and northern Borneo were 
increased and became also rather more special The first period was 
instrumental m  bringing Islam to Brunei This was the result of trading 
relations and was to lead to further economic and cultural ties But the bonds 
of religion and trade were not peculiar to the two regions Again, these were 
features shared by most of the people of Southeast Asia The second period was 
when both regions came under British rule m  one form or another The Malayan 
West Coast was the first to be linked m  this way through the Straits 
settlements of Malacca, Penang and Singapore, not long afterwards Sarawak came 
under the control of Rajah Brooke Then came the British move inland into the 
States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and eventually Pahang, and about this 
time Sabah came to be dominated by the merchant adventurers of the North Borneo 
company Finally, to complete the work of colonial expansion, the British 
developed special relationships with Johore and the four northern states of 
Malaya at the beginning of this century After the Second World War, both Sabah 
and Sarawak joined the other territories which were under the direct 
responsibility of the colonial office?
Malaysia, with a total area of about 130,000 sq miles is just about equal 
in size to Thailand The Bornean territories of Sarawak and Sabah together make 
up only one-sixth of the area of Borneo 8
Broadly these lands occupy the northern flank of a great area formed by 
Sumatra, Java and the lesser Sunda islands Being centrally located inside the
5Indonesian archipelago, Malaysia has certain strategic advantages in internal
lines of communication by the sea In case of sea-borne traffic between Europe 
and Africa on the one hand, and China and Japan on the other, one would prefer 
the transit of Malacca Straits and South China Sea to the detour around the 
extensive Indonesian archipelagos, or to the traverse of narrower, more tortuous 
and coral-girt passages such as the Sunda and Sumba Straits To some extent, 
also, the Malay peninsula may be considered as a link between the continental 
and insular parts of Southeast Asia, which together provide short and sheltered 
coastal passages eastwards to Australia 9
However, substantial distances separate West and East Malaysia and this 
indicates that the difficulties of integration which confronted Pakistan might 
also apply to Malaysia In case of Malaysia the western and eastern parts are 
divided by sea whereas m  case of Pakistan it was land The whole territory of 
Sabah lies closer to Manila than to Kuala Lumpur
Since North Borneo flanks the sea-route to China the Chinese thanselves and 
then the Malays and a succession of European colonial powers impinged upon it 
coasts As in Malaya the "land divides and sea unites'^Q and so the two coasts 
of northern Borneo, north-west and north-east, are to this day areas apart and 
unconnected by surface transport As in Malaya, also there are three zones on 
each coast - first the coastal flats, next a belt of low hills and undulations 
rather steeper than in Malaya, and in the interior ranges of up to 8,000 ft 
with the majestic Kinabalu towering to 13,000 ft Owing to the rapids and to 
the sandba::s at their estuaries the rivers of north Borneo were less useful as a 
means of access to the interior In the absence of tin deposits here there was 
no inducement to 19th century pioneers to penetrate inland Hence when the 
rubber boom began at the end of the century Borneo could not compete with Malaya
6whose communications had been developed to meet the needs of the tin industry 
Borneo remained sparsely inhabited and economically backward Sarawak covers 
around 47,000 sq miles and Sabah 29,000 sq miles on the north and 
north-western side of Borneo - the third largest island in the world For 
administrative purposes Sarawak is broken up into five divisions, each m  turn 
divided into districts Sarawak' Third Division cuts a great swathe through 
the State's heartland and alone covers half its 50,000 sq miles Here live 
about a third of Sarawak population The third division and its administrative 
capital, Sibu provide classic guerrilla terrain, thick forest, bad 
communications and an economic depression The region's artery is the 350 mile 
long Rejang river which ocean-going ships ply as far as Sibu itself
Sibu, like Sankei and other town rivers, had been settled by the Poochow - 
a hard bitten Chinese community who fled their homeland to escape the 
persecution Their loyalty to one another far transcends that to any greater 
entity, and it is this strength that enables them to bear all sorts of 
troubles
The island of Borneo forms part of the chain of archipelagoes which extend 
from Japan, through Okinawa and Taiwan, to the Philippines, Indonesia,
Australia and New Zealand - an island chain separated fron the Asian mainland by 
the natural barrier of the China Sea H  The coastline of Malaysian Borneo, 
including Brunei, stretches for 1,500 miles, and the land frontier with 
Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan) us 1,000 miles long
The country is a vast roadless, railless expanse of jungle and mountain 
The m a m  lines of communication to Borneo are by sea and air The numerous 
rivers and a few jungle trails are the only means of travel between coast and 
hinterland, a factor which has accounted for the low level of internal
7developments in the area
The low lying plains are punctuated by small hills, swamps, narrow strio of 
forests anc dense mangrove swamps These areas provide an ideal hiding and 
training ground for Guerrillas and insurgents because of being highly developed 
and large centres of population
Between the coast and the mountainous border country, much of Borneo is 
covered by dense tropical rain-forest which forms an almost unbroken canopy a 
hundred feet or so above the ground At times one has to make use of hand 
beacons as a honing device If one loses sight of the back of one who is 
immediately in front of him, he would lose his way and get separated from the 
group
The Sarawak border with Kalimantan, running from the west rises rapidly to 
3000 ft and culminates in mountains rising to 8,000 ft The Sabah border 
continues on at 8,000 ft and gradually descends to 3,000 ft Sections of 
relatively level land are interspersed amongst the ranges and these are settled 
and cultivated by hill tribes
As there are no roads and railways, transport in the area is mainly water 
borne, leading to a coastal and river civilization Most of the population live 
within easy reach of waterways The population is a conglomeration of many 
races Malays, the indigenous tribes - Ibans, Muruts, Kelabits, Kayans, Punans, 
and many others, and Chinese 12 The latter are the largest immigrant population 
and it is believed that they are potentially the gravest threat to internal 
security n  Eastern Malaysia I3 "Straits of Malacca" has a great strategic
significance As its geographical position indicates, the straits constitutes 
an artery Df international maritime transport and communication between the East 
and the West Indeed as a three hundred mile waterway, the Straits and their
8intervening zones form the shortest route between the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
In recent years the straits have become the busiest sea lane in Southeast Asia, 
with over 100 ships passing through it everyday 15 According to a conservative 
estimate more than 40,000 vessels pass through the Straits including nearly 
8,000 oil tankers 16 Historically, the Straits of Malacca has been one of the 
world's great international waterways It was one of the two trade routes, 
between East and West The other was the overland or the silk route, stretching 
across Central Asia The development of commercial relations between East and 
West depended very much on the security of these routes Conditions of 
insecurity prevailing in one, served to increase the use of the other route 
The sea route had certain advantages over the land route - it was cheaper and 
it provided a direct route between East and West The use of the sea passage 
through the Malacca Straits has been attested to by Chinese historians and 
travellers such as I-Tsing Roman trade going through the straits is attested 
to by the Roman Geographer Strabo as early as A D 20 Potlemy's Geograph ike 
Syntaxis, describing the lands beyond India provides a good historical account 
of the commerce passing through the Straits A historian has commented that in 
the command of the Straits of Malacca, Funan "provided a model to all the 
Portuguese, Dutch and British which they consciously or unconsciously 
followed She was indeed the essential middleman between India and China" 17 
After the fall of Funan, Sri Vigay's expansion towards the northwest and 
Southeast enabled her to dominate both the sea passages of the Malacca Straits 
and the Sunda Straits between the Indian Ocean and the China Sea 18 The 
creation of commercial empires in the historical past, centred generally in the 
Straits of Malacca 19 The rise of Malacca kingdom in the 15th century stemmed 
directly from its geographical and strategic position which provided it control
9of the waters of the Straits of Malacca being the crucial route taken by 
commercial traffic 20 The earlier island kingdom, Sri Vijay was situated near 
present day Palembang, another strategic site for controlling the Straits of 
Malacca and Sunda In fact, the development of Malacca which had no 
agricultural base depended crucially on its control of the Straits waterway and 
the commercial traffic that passed through it Commerce became the lifeblood of 
Malacca, situated as it was, conveniently, for shipping fron every direction 
With the rise of the great maritime nations of Europe such as Portugal, Spain, 
Holland and England and the intrusion of European colonial powers into the South 
East Asian region, the Straits became more than ever a key waterway whose 
control was keenly contested Originally the spice trade was the main 
motivation for the colonial powers seeking to extend their influence by 
establishing fortified trading points in this part of the world and they did not 
fail to see the crucial value of controlling the Straits in monopolising the 
spice trade Alfonso d 'Albuquerque, the Portuguese Viceroy, pushed on eastwards 
after capture of Goa in 1510 to gain control of the Straits of Malacca Malacca 
fell in 1 5 M  to the Portuguese and the Portuguese built a "Famosa" as their base 
point from which to exercise naval supremacy in the Straits The Straits' 
strategic value to the Portuguese was that it provided a secure link between Goa 
and Macao Portuguese naval supremacy, however, did not go unchallenged and the 
growth of a regional naval power centred in Acheh, provided the m a m  challenge 
in addition to the opposition of the Malacca sultanate, and later the Dutch 21 
In the first years of the Portuguese occupation of Malacca, the Malacca 
Sultanate continued to harass the Portuguese in the Straits as the Malacca ruler 
retained authority over the vassal states of Malacca ruler retained authority 
over the vassal states of Malacca on the opposite shore Acheh was centred in
10
North Sumatra and in the first half of the sixteenth century began extending 
its control down the Sumatran coast The sixteenth century also witnessed a 
clash of interests among the Portuguese, the Achenese and the Malacca Sultanate, 
that has been termed the Triangular conflict In 1641, the Dutch succeeded in 
wresting Malacca from Portuguese and like the Portuguese proceeded to build a 
commercial network in the region, especially to control the pepper and tin 
trade 22 The Dutch conquest of Malacca was motivated by the fact that although 
its (Holland's) m a m  interests remained focussed on the spice islands and later 
on Java itself, the geographical position and the economic importance of the 
Malacca straits insisted that when the Dutch had strength enough, they should 
endeavour to establish their control there 23 Acheh was the dominant power in 
the Malacca Straits at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but there was a 
decline of Achenese power that coincided with the Portuguese capitulation of 
Malacca This was also due to internal political changes
Dutch interest m  Malacca continued throughout the 17th century, arising 
very much out of Malacca's strategic location at the narrowest part of the 
straits Malacca belongs to the category of frontier places, which cannot be 
abandoned, or confined to a role of trading post or colony Like the Portuguese 
before them, Dutch naval superiority did not go unchallenged and the period 
oetween 1750 and 1790 witnessed a period of conflict in the Straits of Malacca, 
generally known as the Anglo-Dutch-Bugis rivalry
The growth of British commerce,especially through activities of British 
traders such as Francis Light and James Scott, and the development of the China 
trade revealed the value of the Dutch control of the sea routes through the 
Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Sunda Francis Light took possession of 
Penang in August 1786 for the East India Company This was motivated by a
11
number of considerations, commercial and strategic
Anglo
(a) To acquire a British entrepot centre m  the Malay Archipelago to 
collect South East Asian produce which were in demand in China
(b) to establish refuelling and provisioning point on the China 
trade route for English East India men superseding Malacca,
(c) to control it in view of strategic consideration, was stimulated 
during the period when the French seamed to have the edge in 
naval operations in the period of the Anglo-French rivalry during 
the latter part of the 18th century The East India Company 
recognized the need to have a naval base on the eastern side of 
the Bay of Bengal when the British got interested in the Malay 
Peninsula The East India Company's China trade used to pass 
through the Straits of Malacca that provided the rationale for 
protection of this route
-Dutch rivalry in the archipelago reached a peak point with the
planting o:E the British Flag on Singapore by Stanford Raffles in 1819 Raffles
had correctly perceived the commanding position of Singapore m  relation to the
Straits of Malacca
Prior to the British possession of Singapore, Raffles was sent by Hastings
in the end of 1818 to conclude a treaty with Acheh, which would provide British
control of the northern straits entrance Further, another British agent
Farquhar w¡is instructed to establish a British post at Riau, at the Southern
entrance of the Strait24
Singa pore is a striking example of the influence of conranercial enterprise
in building up the British Empire Sir Stanford Raffles, in 1819, occupied it 
not only for military, but for trading purposes also Raffles was then Lt
12
Governor of Bencoolen, the East India Company's settlement m  Sumatra Java, 
which had been conquered from the Dutch in 1811 with loss of English soldiers 
and sailors had been given back to Holland after the peace of 1815 The East 
India Company lost its control of the Malay Archipelago Realizing that the 
Dutch Governor of Java was about to seize Singapore, Raffles took steps to 
forestall him by taking peaceful possession of the island under an agreement 
with the Rajah of Johor 25 The Anglo-Dutch wranglings provoked by Raffles' 
possession of Singapore and the subsequent negotiations on Anglo-Dutch interests 
were brought to a settlement by the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1828 The treaty 
officially concluded on 17 March 1824 confirmed the British possession of 
Singapore 26 The British seemed to be very clear about their intentions and they 
maintained that "the price was not land but trade and the object of policy was 
the control of routes not areas "27 British control of the Straits was complete 
with Penang at one end and Singapore on the other British naval supremacy in 
the Straits renamed unchallenged till the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia 
and the subsequent fall of Singapore The Straits of Malacca became a Japanese 
seaway in the Asian co-prosperity shpere of Japan, till the unconditional 
capitulation of Japan in 1945
The Straits has always been dominated either by a regional power wielding 
naval hegemony over the Straits, like Funan, Sri Vijaya and Malacca or global 
maritime powers like Portugal, Holland, Britain and Japan The powers that 
dominated the straits always tended to push for a complete control of the 
straits and the alternative land and sea routers Funan controlled both the 
Straits sea lane and the over land Kra Isthmus route Sri Vijaya expanded her 
power northwards to control the Straits of Malacca and southwards to control the 
Sunda Straits The Malacca Sultanate's dependencies across the Straits in
13
Sumatra ensured a more or less complete dominance by the Malacca Sultanate over 
the traffic passing through the Straits Dutch maritime control over both the 
Malacca straits route and the Sunda straits route provoked a sense of insecurity 
in the British minds because they were perhaps keen to have a direct say in the 
affairs of the Straits of Malacca Even after signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty 
of 1824, by which British possession of Singapore was confirmed, the British 
wanted to maintain their treaty of 1819 with Acheh to ensure control of the 
northern entrance of the straits, in spite of having Penang, Malacca and 
Singapore
Whenever any crisis prevailed in the Straits of Malacca, alternative routes 
were resorted to For instance, when piracy became rife in the straits, 
following the fall of Sri Vijaya, commercial traffic began to use the more round 
about route via the west of Sumatra and the Sunda straits 28 Again during the 
early Portuguese occupation of Malacca, the growth Acheh witnessed a shift m  
shipping away from the Straits of Malacca to the Straits of Sunda and the west 
of Sumatra 29 This was also due to the development of Acheh at this point as a 
centre of the spice trade The overland route across the Kra Isthmus was used 
extensively during the early days of Indian penetration but also later when Sri 
Vijaya exercised strict control over the Straits and ships were forced to call 
at her ports 20
Perhaps the desire to command and control the Straits of Malacca led to the 
occupation of strategic points like Malacca, Penang and Singapore, and even the 
hinterland areas The Malacca Straits area was so important to the overall 
distribution of British Trade, the China trading interests so powerful, and 
foreign office and Admirallty ideas on the subject so precisely formulated, that 
it was only necessary for a situation to develop which made foreign intervention
14
even a remote possibility for action to be taken
At the present the Straits of Malacca is not only important for the states 
of the Southeast Asian region but also for those outside it It is one of the 
world's major shipping lanes
Oil is crucial for Japan's transport and industries Without the life line 
for big tankers plying through the Straits to the Middle East oil fields,
Japan's progress and development could not have been possible Japan has been 
importing more than 90 per cent of her oil requirements fran Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and the Middle Eastern Oil coutnnes and these are transported by some 
220 tankers, each averaging to 90,000 tons and making about 10 trips a year (or 
even more now) across the Straits of Malacca 31 The importance of the straits 
as the main route through which oil will be continued to be shipped is bound to 
increase given the growth of Japanese industry, barring any dramatic 
developments in the near future Apart from oil shipping the Straits has great 
significance for Japanese economic development
According to the Japanese Economic Research Centre, the GNP for 1975 was 
projected to be in the range of US $400 billion and in 1983 it was recorded to 
be $1,137,778 Since the Japanese economy is based on the inflow of raw 
materials and the outflow of finished goods, the demand for raw materials will 
continue to increase, thus increasing the Japanese share m  maritime trade 32 
It is calculated that Japan's volume of consumption of raw materials of all 
categories is second only to the United States and with regard to the total 
volume of raw materials imported, Japan is world's largest importer All this 
has resulted in a marked increase in the volume of the foreign trade of Japan 
and consequently the Japanese maritime fleet is undergoing rapid expansion 33
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Another important factor in the context of the future role and importance 
of Straits of Malacca is Soviet Union Lately, Soviet Union has started taking 
keen interest in the Indian Ocean region and with the Soviet naval build-up, the 
Malacca Straits is assuming a new strategic significance m  the context of 
Soviet global naval strategy The importance of the Straits of Malacca also 
enhanced because of the sizeable Soviet naval presence m  the Indian Ocean and 
the closure of Suez Canal for a certain period of time "The Soviets now 
realize and intend to exploit the potential of the sea power it will be used 
in an attempt to keep the United States off balance possibly to prevent the U S 
Navy from becoming thoroughly committed to any specific course of action" 34 
Soviets want to gain dominant influence at several major junctions of the 
world's seaways Specifically, they have their eyes on the Suez Canal, the Bab 
al-Mandeb, the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Gibralter 35
If Russia's Naval presence in the Indian Ocean is to have its full impact, 
unrestricted access to the Malacca Straits would seem imperative 36 jf we bear 
in mind that in naval rivalry of the two superpowers, United States of America 
and Russia, America has the advantage of two coastal portages the Atlantic and 
the Pacific and thus need not go through the Malacca Straits to get into the 
Indian Ocean On the other hand, the shortest route between the Indian Ocean 
and Russian naval elements based in Vladivostok on the Western Pacific is the 
Malacca Straits
Straits of Malacca is strategically very important for India also Looking 
at the map of Indian Ocean region with an Indian viewpoint one can think of the 
future role of Indian Navy for the protection of its merchant marine and the 
trade lanes If the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are given due consideration and 
a sophisticated naval base is established m  time to come, it will be much
16
easier to protect Indian security and trade interests in the Indian Ocean 
region
Any one who commands Andaman and Nicobar Islands would be able to conduct a 
successful Naval Blockade of Straits of Malacca very easily and therefore m  
view of India's potential power, one must consider India to be a Straits of 
Malacca power which would matter in any conflict situation in Southeast and 
South Asia in general and Indian Ocean m  particular In a given situation, at 
the dictates of vital national interests, there may be Indo-Soviet naval 
cooperation to deal with a situation in which India's and USSR's interests are 
threatened in Indian Ocean international conflict
The Straits of Malacca has become more important also because the sea-bed 
and the continental shelf hold rich promise of mineral wealth, especially 
petroleum and natrual gas 37 in 1969, Malaysia and Indonesia through the treaty 
arangements established the boundaries of the continental shelves between the 
two countries and there is an active search for offshore oil throughout the 
entire Malaysian coastline This is also true of the Indonesian coastal areas
The most promising exportation results in the South China sea have so far 
been made in the Malaysian sector, both off the coast of the Malay Peninsula and 
off Sarawak and Sabah m  northern Borneo These discoveries may enable Malaysia 
to become a fairly large exporter of oil, and also of gas by 1990s 38
In view of its oil reserves Malaysia is not only important to outside 
powers but also to the regional powers, i e Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Phillippmes Since, Singapore is the third largest refinery centre m  the 
world (after Houston and Rotterdam) the oil reserves in surrounding areas have 
strategic significance from its own point of view Instead of importing totally 
from the Middle Eastern area Singapore can utilize Indonesian, Malaysian, and
17
Thai oil and re-export as oil products to Japan, South Vietnam and Hongkong 39 
Japan has been purchasing Indonesian oil also and it took almost three-quarters 
of Indonesia's oil exports su40
Since oil is a commodity of basic strategic importance, no modern defence 
system Cc,n be maintained and no wars fought without a great supply of oil It 
is a matter of vital importance for those responsible for planning national 
security and more important than the assurance that the country can count on 
sufficient supplies of oil to sustain its defence In an era of extensive 
mechanization and high mobility oil has become an important element
A potential cause of instability/insecurity might be the fact that every 
country possessing substantial reserves of oil within or near its t e r m  tory 
will feel forced to consider the protection of these reserves and their 
installations this consideration will undoubtedly reflect on these countries 
Defence Planning and arms acquisition policies
SINGAPORE
The southern part of the Straits of Malacca is connected with the Singapore 
Strait It is considered as the continuation of the southern end of the Straits 
of Malacca The Singapore Strait separates the Indonesian Islands lying off the 
Sumatra coast from the southern coasts of Johore and Singapore island The 
Singapore Strait joins the high seas of the Malacca Straits to those of the 
South Asia but one of the smallest countries in the world in land area It 
enjoys tne second highest standard of living in Asia after Japan and shows signs 
of potential economic importance far beyond what its trading tradition would 
suggest It is physically overshadowed by two bigger neighbours - Indonesia and 
Malaysia With a combined population of 130 million which are hostile to
18
Chinese influence, it is at the centre of Southeast Asia which is likely during 
the next twenty years to be as unstable in its power balance as were the Balkans 
a century ago Like Malta and Aden, it was a British imperial creation which is 
now m  the process of determining its post-imperial role Singapore broke away 
from the federation and became independent in 1965 This port was a key station 
in the British Empire's world-wide military, communications, and trade systems 
Its entreport trade function, and its commercial services to Western Indonesia, 
Thailand and British Malaya were significant elements in its economic 
development As such the city attracted a large immigrant population of 
Chinese, and Chinese have steadily been the dominant ethnic element on the 
island and in the city
After the end of Wörld War II, with the shift m  British world policy, as 
national independence came to both Indonesia and Malaysia, the position and 
fortunes of Singapore have been changing, but at the same time they have became 
more precariously balanced 41 Prosperity of the port and its city has been 
dependent on regional and world conditions, and the steady decrease of British 
expenditures on the Military-naval-air base, made this dependence steadily 
greater In the long past the prosperity of any port city m  the location of 
Singapore depended upon good conditions for free trade in the surrounding 
region, and present prosperity equally reflects that situation 42
Singapore base was established particularly for the purposes of defence 
It was considered that one who commands Singapore can easily base a fleet in the 
Straits of Malacca which could destroy or neutralize any enemy forces operating 
against Australia, guard the approach to India from the east, protect Burma and 
the Persian Oil fields, and cover both the trade routes and communications 43
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One of the main reasons Great Britain constructed the Singapore naval base 
was to prevent the Japanese navy fron erupting into the Indian Ocean
From the point of view of offensive operations, the position of Singapore 
also possessed certain advantages Though ships based there would find it 
difficult to carry out offensive operations against the Nipponese mainland, some 
3,000 miles away, it seemed likely that they could prevent passage of Japanese 
shipping into the Indian Ocean, thereby subjecting Tokyo's Middle Asian and 
European commerce to a distant blockade
Regarding Singapore's security value, there was good reason for military 
experts 44 to believe that the city's peculiar location endowed it with strong 
protection against sea attack It had linkages with Malayan Security also To 
the west, for 200 miles the average width of Straits of Malacca is under 25 
miles, while to the east, numerous small islands extend many miles to 
sea-concltions highly conducive to air, submarine, and minefield defence 
Although the Malay peninsula to the north is jointed to the island by the 
causeway, a landing at any point nearabouts by a hostile power was deemed to be 
easily subject to British Naval interception Even if successful the Malay 
swamps and jungles and the imperial land defences, particularly along the 
relatively easy terrain of the western shore, would make subsequent advances 
unlikely An overland invasion from Thailand was considered similarly difficult 
since it, too would involve a long march through Malaya In view of the lack of 
important land routes leading to Malaya it was envisaged that the supply of 
modern v/eapon systems would be through sea and any such plan of the ensny could 
be previnted by an adequate naval force based on Singapore Air attack was also 
envisagid as difficult since it had to be launched either from exposed sea 
carriers or from landing fields so far away as to reduce materially the number
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of planes employed and the weight of the bombs used 45 Subsequent events have, 
of course, shown that these ideas of Singapore's security were optimistic to a 
high degree
Singapore also stood as the refuelling station between Ceylon and 
Australia Singapore's proximity to Burma, India and the Persian Gulf, and the 
comparative safety of communications from those points, resting on the British 
control of the Suez Canal, virtually assured the flow from India of essential 
supplies, such as coal, oil and certain military stores As for food, it could 
be secured from the Malay states and the neighbouring colonies of the East 
Indies 46
And, even today, it is the "strategic location" of Singapore which helps it 
m  many ways Today it prefers to call itself a "poison shrimp" which would 
stick in the throat of any would-be devourer
The distance involved for ships heading to Singapore by going through Kra 
Canal and steering south will not be appreciably greater than that through the 
Straits of Malacca The net result for Singapore of a Kra Canal will be that 
access to it from the Indian Ocean will be available down the straits as well as 
through the canal using the gulf of Siam and South China Sea If the Straits of 
Malacca is bypassed and tankers and container vessels become the m a m  means for 
conveying international cargo, Singapore's importance will grow rather than 
diminish The economics of tanker and container traffic will dictate that bulk 
cargo should be broken in Singapore, to be distributed by smaller vessels to 
ports south of the Kra Canal, most of which would be off the international route 
were the straits to lose its free passage status 47 The Japanese super-tankers 
most likely will have to go South of Sumatra on the Persian Gulf-Japan run but 
Singapore's role as a regional balancing centre for oil companies will not be
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affected by this 48
Looking differently, the Island of Singapore, located at the tip of the 
Malay pLninsula, can be regarded as a stepping stone across a land bridge that 
links mainland Asia to the Indonesian archipelago This Malay land bridge can 
also be regarded as a land barrier dividing the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
Accordingly, m  the North-South Orientation, Singapore is a potential transit 
point for commercial or military traffic starting from China or points south of 
China, such as Thailand and Malaysia and destined for Indonesia In the 
East-West direction, Singapore, as a part of Malay Peninsula, will attract the 
attention of those big powers that have special interests in the eastern 
littoral of the Indian Ocean and/or the south-western littoral of the Western 
Pacific Singapore is attempting to create a niche for itself by developing 
into an important trading centre49 for major nations of the world The whole
idea behind Singapore's doctrine of survival is to make any attempt at 
aggression so expensive m  terms of human and material resources that the cost 
alone would force anyone to think more than twice before any adventure
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